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On approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games with polynomial latencies∗
Ioannis Caragiannis† Angelo Fanelli‡
Abstract
We study natural improvement dynamics in weighted congestion games with polynomial
latencies of maximum degree d ≥ 1. We focus on two problems regarding the existence
and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable small approximation
factor, in these games.
By exploiting a simple technique, we firstly show that such a game always admits a
d-approximate potential function. This implies that every sequence of d-approximate im-
provement moves by the players leads to a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. As a
corollary, we also obtain that, under mild assumptions on the structure of the players’
strategies, the game always admits a constant approximate potential function. Secondly,
using a simple potential function argument, we are able to show that a (d+ δ)-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium of cost at most (d + 1)/(d + δ) times the cost of an optimal state
always exists, for δ ∈ [0, 1].
1 Introduction
Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in
Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations in which no player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff.
Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have any pure Nash equilib-
rium. Furthermore, even in games where the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed,
these equilibria could be very inefficient compared to solutions dictated by a central authority.
Such negative results significantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution
concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players.
One way to overcome the limitations of the non-existence and inefficiency of pure Nash
equilibria is to consider a relaxation of the stability constraint. This relaxation leads to the
concept of approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This concept characterizes situations where no
player can significantly improve her payoff by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy.
Approximate pure Nash equilibria can accommodate small modeling inaccuracies (e.g., see the
arguments in [7]), therefore they may be more desirable as solution concepts in practical decision-
making settings. Besides their existence and efficiency, approximate pure Nash equilibria are
appealing alternative solution concepts from a computational point of view (e.g., [3, 4, 6, 12, 2]).
In this work, we investigate the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria
in weighted congestion games. These games form a general framework which models situations
where a group of agents compete for the use of a set of shared resources. In the following, we
define weighted congestion games and give a formal statement of the problems we address. We
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†University of Patras & CTI “Diophantus”, Greece. Email: caragian@ceid.upatras.gr.
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continue this section with a discussion of the related literature and a detailed presentation of
our contribution.
Weighted congestion games. In a weighted congestion game, players compete over a set
of resources. Each player has a positive weight. Each resource incurs a latency to all players
who use it. This latency depends on the total weight (congestion) of the players that use the
resource according to a resource-specific, non-negative, and non-decreasing latency function.
Among a given set of strategies (over sets of resources), each player aims to select one selfishly,
trying to minimize her individual total cost, i.e., the sum of the latencies on the resources in her
strategy. Typical examples include weighted congestion games in networks, where each network
link corresponds to a resource, and each player has alternative paths that connect two nodes as
strategies. A particular setting is when latencies are polynomial functions of the total weights
of the users; we call such a setting a weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies. This
game is formally described as follows.
A weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of maximum degree d ≥ 1
(we use WCG(d) to denote the class of these games) consists of a set of players N =
{1, 2, . . . , |N |} and a set of resources E = {1, 2, . . . , |E|}. Each player i is associated
with a weight wi ∈ R
>0 and a set of strategies Si ⊆ 2
E . Every resource e is described
by a pair (ae, ke) ∈ R
>0 × [0, d], which encodes the latency function ℓe : 2
N 7→ R≥0
associated with e, mapping every subset of players P ⊆ N to the non-negative real
ae
(∑
j∈P wj
)ke
. We refer to ae and ke as the coefficient and the degree of resource
e, respectively. The set of states of the game is denoted by S = S1 × S2 × . . . × S|N |.
For every state s ∈ S, we refer to its i-th component, that is the strategy played by
player i in s, by s(i). For every state s and resource e, we denote by Le(s) the set of
players using resource e in s, i.e., Le(s) = {j ∈ N : e ∈ s(j)}. We refer to the sum of
the weights of all the players in Le(s) as the congestion of e in s. For every state s,
the cost incurred by player i in s is ci(s) =
∑
e∈s(i) ℓe(Le(s)). For τ > 0, we say that a
game in WCG(d) is τ -congested if for every resource e ∈ E, every state s ∈ S, and any
player i ∈ Le(s), it holds that
∑
j∈Le(s)\{i}
wj ≥ τkewi.
Equilibria, potential functions, and the price of stability. We now introduce concepts
that are necessary to formally state our problems and present our results. For every state
s ∈ S, every player i ∈ N and every s ∈ Si, we denote by [s−i, s] the new state obtained from
s by setting the i-th component, that is the strategy of i, to s and keeping all the remaining
components unchanged, i.e., [s−i, s](i) = s and [s−i, s](j) = s(j) for every player j 6= i.
The transition from s to [s−i, s] is called a move of player i from state s. For α ≥ 1, we say
that a transition from s to [s−i, s] is an α-improvement move for i if αci([s−i, s]) < ci(s). For
α ≥ 1, we say that a state-valued function Γ : S 7→ R≥0 is an α-approximate potential function
for the game if it strictly decreases at every α-improvement move; formally, Γ([s−i, s]) < Γ(s)
whenever αci([s−i, s]) < ci(s). If the game admits an α-approximate potential function Γ,
then every sequence of strictly α-improvement moves leads to a local optimum of Γ, i.e., to
a state in which no further α-improvement move can be performed. Such a state is called
α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. Formally, for α ≥ 1, we say that a state s ∈ S is an
α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium if, for every player i ∈ N and every strategy s ∈ Si, we
have ci(s) ≤ αci([s−i, s]). If α = 1, we simply refer to s as a pure Nash equilibrium rather
than a 1-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. For α ≥ 1, we denote by Eα ⊆ S the set of all
α-approximate pure Nash equilibria of the game.
The social cost of state s ∈ S is the weighted sum of the players’ costs, i.e., C(s) =
2
∑
i∈N wici(s). Notice that, by summing over the resources instead of the players, C(s) can be
rewritten as C(s) =
∑
e∈E ae
(∑
j∈Le(s)
wj
)ke+1
. Every state s ∈ S that minimizes the social
cost is called a social optimum. We denote by OPT the set of social optima of the game, i.e.,
OPT = argmins∈S C(s). Let o ∈ OPT be any social optimum of the game with positive social
cost, we define the α-approximate price of stability of the game as PoSα = mine∈Eα
C(e)
C(o) .
Problem statements. In this work, we consider the following two problems in weighted
congestion games with polynomial latencies:
(I) Existence of convergent sequences of α-improvement moves. In this
problem we seek for a reasonable small α ≥ 1 for which any sequence of α-
improvement moves converges to an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This
would be equivalent to saying that the game admits an α-approximate potential
function, whose value decreases at every α-improvement move and whose local
optima coincide with α-approximate pure Nash equilibria.
(II) Bounding the approximate price of stability. In this problem, assuming
that the game admits an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, we aim at
bounding its α-approximate price of stability.
Related work. The unweighted setting (i.e., when all players have unit weights) with general
latencies has been widely studied in the literature. For this case, Rosenthal [19] proved that
there exists a 1-approximate potential function. This immediately implies that every sequence
of 1-improvement moves by the players leads to a pure Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, this
nice property does not carry over when players have weights. In fact, a 1-approximate potential
function exists only when the latencies are linear or exponential [13, 16, 18]. For polynomial
latencies of constant maximum degree strictly higher than 1, pure Nash equilibria may not
exist [13, 14, 17]. More generally, for arbitrary latencies, the problem of deciding whether a
given instance has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard [11]. Caragiannis et al. [4] proved that
games in WCG(d) admits a d!-approximate potential function. This results has been subsequently
improved considerably by Hansknecht et al. [15], who showed that the game admits a (d+ 1)-
approximate potential function. Their potential function is defined in a parameterized way,
using an ordering of the players as parameter. The (d + 1)-approximate potential function is
obtained using a non-decreasing ordering of the players, in terms of their weights.
The 1-approximate price of stability for games in WCG(d) has been recently investigated by
Christodoulou et al. in [9]; they provided a lower bound of Ω(d/ log d)d+1, matching the upper
bound of Aland et al. [1]. The authors of [9] also showed bounds to the α-approximate price of
stability. Specifically, they proved that for games in WCG(d) with weights ranging in [1, wmax],
there exists an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, for any α in the range [2(d+1)wmax2wmax+d+1 , d+1],
whose cost is at most 1+(d+1
α
−1)wmax times the cost of any optimal state. Their proof exploits
a potential function called Faulhaber’s potential. For the unweighted setting, tight bounds of
1.577 for linear latencies [10, 5] and of Θ(d) for polynomial latencies of degree d ≥ 1 [8] are
known.
Our contribution. Concerning the first problem, we show (in Theorem 2) that games in WCG(d)
admit d-approximate potential functions. This implies that every sequence of d-improvement
moves by the players always leads the game to a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This
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result is achieved using the technique that is formalized in Lemma 1 and the class of state-
valued functions Φγ defined in Definition 1. Essentially, while Definition 1 provides a simple
interesting class of candidate potential functions, Lemma 1 gives a local condition to each
resource to determine the approximation guarantee achieved by a given state-valued function.
So, by exploiting Lemma 1, in Theorem 2 we are able to show that the class Φγ contains d-
approximate potential functions and, more generally, (d + δ)-approximate potential functions,
for every δ ∈ [0, 1]. We remark that, our potential functions are substantially different from the
potential function proposed in [15]. In fact, while the potential in [15] is obtained in a Rosenthal-
like fashion, by ordering the players and summing their costs assuming that each player is
affected only by the congestion caused by preceding players in the ordering, our potential is
much simpler and is obtained by a suitable scaling of the coefficients of the polynomials in the
definition of the latency functions. As a matter of fact, our potentials, despite their simplicity,
provide an approximation factor approaching d instead of d + 1, although it is worth noticing
that, for small values of d, the two approaches provide the same approximation guarantee.
As a corollary of Theorem 2, we also show (see Corollary 4) that the social optimum of any
game in WCG(d) is always a (d + 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, as it has already been
observed in [9]. More importantly, the proof of Theorem 2 implies, as stated by Corollary 5, that
τ -congested games in WCG(d) admit approximate potential functions with considerably better
approximation guarantees (approaching 1 for very high congestion).
We also show that, the class of functions Φγ also serves as an essential tool to give a very
low constant bound on the approximate price of stability. In fact, by exploiting Φγ , we are
able to show (Theorem 7) an upper bound of (d+ 1)/(d+ δ) for the (d+ δ)-approximate price
of stability, for every δ ∈ [0, 1]. To prove this bound, we use the standard potential function
argument. Specifically, we first bound (in Lemma 6) the value of the (d + δ)-approximate
potential function for a given state in terms of the social cost of that state; if we then perform
a sequence of (d+ δ)-improvement moves starting from an optimal state, the potential does not
increase, and hence we can bound the cost of any (d + δ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium
that we reach. Notice that our bound does not depend on the range of the players’ weights
and significantly improves the bound provided in [9], by making use of a different and simpler
potential function.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with the definition of a
class of state-valued functions in Section 2. In Section 3 we first present a simple technique to
bound the approximation guarantee of a given state-valued function. Subsequently, we show
that some elements of the class introduced in Section 2 provide a good approximation. In
Section 4 we present the bound on the approximate price of stability.
2 A class of state-valued functions
Before presenting our technical results, we define a class of functions mapping every state of
the game to a non-negative real number. This class of functions will be heavily exploited in the
subsequent sections.
Definition 1. For every γ = (γe)e∈E , we define
Φγ(s) =
∑
e∈E
aeΨ
γe
e
(
Le(s)
)
,
4
where, for every resource e ∈ E, it is Ψγee
(
∅
)
= 0 and
Ψγee (P ) =
γe
ke + 1

∑
j∈P
wj


ke+1
+
(
1−
γe
ke + 1
)∑
j∈P
wke+1j ,
for every nonempty subset of players P ⊆ N .
3 Approximate potential functions
The main result of this section is given by Theorem 2, which states the existence of approximate
potential functions with low approximation factors. Before presenting this result, in Lemma 1
we illustrate our tool to define an approximate potential function. This tool gives a local
condition to each resource to determine the approximation guarantee of a given state-valued
function. We conclude the section with two corollaries. The first (Corollary 4) states that the
social optimum of an instance of WCG(d) is always a (d+1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
The second (Corollary 5) indicates that, under mild conditions, games in WCG(d) always admits
a constant approximate potential function.
Lemma 1. Let Γ : S 7→ R>0 be a state-valued function such that Γ(s) =
∑
e∈E aeΓe
(
Le(s)
)
,
where Γe : 2
N 7→ R>0. If, for every resource e ∈ E, every non-empty subset of players P ⊆ N
and every player i ∈ P , there exist λ, υ ∈ R>0, with λ ≤ υ, such that
wiℓe(P )
ae
(
Γe(P )− Γe(P \ {i})
) ∈ [λ, υ] (1)
then Γ is a
(
υ
λ
)
-approximate potential function.
Proof. Let us consider a state s ∈ S and a player i. Let us assume that i can perform an
υ
λ
-improvement move by replacing strategy s(i) with s 6= s(i), i.e., υ
λ
ci([s−i, s]) < ci(s). In order
to prove the claim we need to show that Γ([s−i, s]) < Γ(s). To this aim, let us bound the
expression Γ([s−i, s])− Γ(s). By the definition of the state-valued function Γ, we have
Γ([s−i, s])− Γ(s) =
∑
e∈E
aeΓe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)
−
∑
e∈E
aeΓe
(
Le(s)
)
=
∑
e∈E
ae
[
Γe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)
− Γe
(
Le(s)
)]
=
∑
e∈s\s(i)
ae
[
Γe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)
− Γe
(
Le(s)
)]
−
∑
e∈s(i)\s
ae
[
Γe
(
Le(s)
)
− Γe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)]
. (2)
Now, observe that player i belongs to Le([s−i, s]) but not to Le(s) when e ∈ s \ s(i) (thus,
Le(s) = Le([s−i, s]) \ {i}), while she belongs to Le(s) but not to Le([s−i, s]) when e ∈ s(i) \ s
(thus, Le([s−i, s]) = Le(s) \ {i} in this case). Hence, by applying (1) to the right-hand side of
(2), we obtain
Γ([s−i, s])− Γ(s) ≤
wi
λ
∑
e∈s\s(i)
ℓe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)
−
wi
υ
∑
e∈s(i)\s
ℓe
(
Le(s)
)
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≤
wi
λ
∑
e∈s\s(i)
ℓe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)
−
wi
υ
∑
e∈s(i)\s
ℓe
(
Le(s)
)
+
(wi
λ
−
wi
υ
) ∑
e∈s(i)∩s
ℓe
(
Le(s)
)
=
wi
λ
∑
e∈s
ℓe
(
Le([s−i, s])
)
−
wi
υ
∑
e∈s(i)
ℓe
(
Le(s)
)
=
wi
υ
(υ
λ
ci([s−i, s])− ci(s)
)
. (3)
The second inequality is due to the fact υ ≥ λ. The first equality follows since Le(s) =
Le([s−i, s]) for e ∈ s(i) ∩ s and the last equality follows by the definition of the players’ cost.
The lemma follows since (3) implies that Γ([s−i, s]) < Γ(s) whenever
υ
λ
ci([s−i, s]) < ci(s).
We are ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Let γ = (γe)e∈E with 1 ≤ γe ≤ ke + 1 for e ∈ E and γ
∗ = maxe∈E γe. Then
(a) Φγ is a ρ–approximate potential function, with ρ = max{γ
∗, d}.
(b) If γ∗ = 1, then Φγ is a ρ–approximate potential function, with
ρ = max
e∈E
sup
x≥0
(
1 + x
)ke
1
ke+1
(
1 + x
)ke+1 + ke
ke+1
− 1
ke+1
xke+1
. (4)
Proof. We prove the claim using Lemma 1. For every resource e ∈ E, every non-empty subset
of players P ⊆ N and every player i ∈ P , we bound the ratio
wiℓe(P )
ae
(
Ψγee (P )−Ψ
γe
e (P \ {i})
) . (5)
For every player i ∈ P , let µi(P ) =
1
wi
∑
j∈P\{i}wj . Hence,
wiℓe(P ) = wiae

∑
j∈P
wj


ke
= wiae

wi + ∑
j∈P\{i}
wj


ke
= aew
ke+1
i
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke . (6)
Now, let us focus on the expression Ψγee (P )−Ψ
γe
e (P \ {i}). Using Definition 1, we have
Ψγee (P )−Ψ
γe
e (P \ {i})
=
γe
ke + 1

∑
j∈P
wj


ke+1
+
(
1−
γe
ke + 1
)∑
j∈P
wke+1j
−
γe
ke + 1

 ∑
j∈P\{i}
wj


ke+1
−
(
1−
γe
ke + 1
) ∑
j∈P\{i}
wke+1j
=
γe
ke + 1

∑
j∈P
wj


ke+1
+
(
1−
γe
ke + 1
)
wke+1i −
γe
ke + 1

 ∑
j∈P\{i}
wj


ke+1
6
=
γe
ke + 1

wi + ∑
j∈P\{i}
wj


ke+1
+
(
1−
γe
ke + 1
)
wke+1i −
γe
ke + 1

 ∑
j∈P\{i}
wj


ke+1
=
γe
ke + 1
wke+1i
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke+1 + (1− γe
ke + 1
)
wke+1i −
γe
ke + 1
wke+1i µi(P )
ke+1
= wke+1i
[
γe
ke + 1
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke+1 + (1− γe
ke + 1
)
−
γe
ke + 1
µi(P )
ke+1
]
. (7)
Using (6) and (7), (5) can be rewritten as
wiℓe(P )
ae
(
Ψγee (P )−Ψ
γe
e (P \ {i})
)
=
aew
ke+1
i
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke
aew
ke+1
i
[
γe
ke+1
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke+1 + (1− γe
ke+1
)
− γe
ke+1
µi(P )ke+1
]
=
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke
γe
ke+1
(
1 + µi(P )
)ke+1 + (1− γe
ke+1
)
− γe
ke+1
µi(P )ke+1
. (8)
To proceed, we will need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3. For every x ∈ R≥0, h ∈ R≥0 and β ∈ R≥1, we have
(1 + x)h
β
h+1(1 + x)
h+1 + (1− β
h+1)−
β
h+1x
h+1
∈
[
1
β
,max
{
1,
h
β
}]
.
Proof. We have
(1 + x)h
β
h+1(1 + x)
h+1 + (1 − β
h+1)−
β
h+1x
h+1
=
∑h
t=0
(
h
t
)
xt
β
h+1
∑h+1
t=0
(
h+1
t
)
xt + (1− β
h+1)−
β
h+1x
h+1
=
1 +
∑h
t=1
(
h
t
)
xt
1 + β
h+1
∑h
t=1
(
h+1
t
)
xt
=
1 +
∑h
t=1
(
h
t
)
xt
1 +
∑h
t=1
β
h+1−t
(
h
t
)
xt
.
The lemma now follows by observing that
min{1, β/h}
(
1 +
h∑
t=1
(
h
t
)
xt
)
≤ 1 +
h∑
t=1
β
h+ 1− t
(
h
t
)
xt ≤ β
(
1 +
h∑
t=1
(
h
t
)
xt
)
.
By applying Lemma 3 to (8) with x = µi(P ), h = ke and β = γe, we obtain that
wiℓe(P )
ae
(
Ψγee (P )−Ψ
γe
e (P \ {i})
) ∈ [ 1
γe
,max
{
1,
ke
γe
}]
.
Part (a) of the theorem follows by Lemma 1 and the facts that γ∗ = maxe∈E γe and d =
maxe∈E ke. Specifically for γe = 1, we get that the quantity (5) is between 1 and the expression
in (4). Then, part (b) of the theorem follows again by Lemma 1.
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Corollary 4. Any social optimum is a (d+ 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let Φγ be the state-valued function with γ = (γe)e∈E and γe = ke + 1 for e ∈ E. The
claim follows by observing that Φγ(s) = C(s) and from the fact that, by Theorem 2, Φγ is a
(d+ 1)-approximate potential function.
Corollary 5. Let τ > 0 and consider a τ -congested game in WCG(d). Then, the state-valued
function Φγ is an exp(1/τ)-approximate potential function.
Proof. The proof is along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2. We remark that, even though
the set P is not restricted in the statement of Lemma 1, whenever it is used in the proofs of
Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, it coincides with the set of players Le(s) for a resource e ∈ E and a
state s ∈ S. Then, the definition of a τ -congested game implies that the quantity µi(P ), that
is used in the proof of Theorem 2, has value at least τke. Hence, the same proof of Theorem 2
yields that the state-valued function Φγ is a ρ-approximate potential function with
ρ = max
e∈E
sup
x≥τke
(
1 + x
)ke
1
ke+1
(
1 + x
)ke+1 + ke
ke+1
− 1
ke+1
xke+1
. (9)
Due to the convexity of function zke+1, the slope of the line connecting points (x, xke+1) and
(1+x, (1+x)ke+1), which is (1+x)ke+1−xke+1, is at least as high as the value of the derivative
of the function zke+1 for z = x, i.e., (ke + 1)x
ke . Hence, (9) yields that
ρ ≤ max
e∈E
sup
x≥τke
(
1 + x
x
)ke
≤ max
e∈E
sup
x≥τke
exp(ke/x) = exp(1/τ),
and the theorem follows.
4 Approximate price of stability
In this section we present our upper bound on the α-approximate price of stability, for α ∈
[d, d+ 1]. This bound is stated by Theorem 7; the proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] and γ = (γe)e∈E where γe = min{ke + 1, d + δ} for e ∈ e. For every
state s ∈ S, it holds that
Φγ(s) ≤ C(s) ≤
d+ 1
d+ δ
Φγ(s).
Proof. Let E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. We need to bound the ratio
C(s)
Φγ(s)
=
∑m
t=1 aet
(∑
j∈Let (s)
wj
)ket+1
∑m
t=1 aetΨ
γet
et
(
Let(s)
) .
In order to do so, we consider the ratio between the t-th term in the numerator and the t-th
term in the denominator, for every t ∈ [m], that is
(∑
j∈Let (s)
wj
)ket+1
Ψ
γet
et
(
Let(s)
) . (10)
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Recall the definition of the state-value function Ψγee , which yields
Ψγee (Let(s)) =
γe
ke + 1

 ∑
j∈Let (s)
wj


ke+1
+
(
1−
γe
ke + 1
) ∑
j∈Let (s)
wke+1j .
By the definition of γe and since
∑
j∈Let (s)
wke+1j ≤
(∑
j∈Let (s)
wj
)ke+1
, we get that (10) is
between 1 and ke+1
γe
= max
{
1, ke+1
d+δ
}
≤ d+1
d+δ . It follows that, C(s)/Φγ(s) is at least 1 and at
most d+1
d+δ and the lemma follows.
Theorem 7. PoSd+δ ≤
d+1
d+δ , for every δ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let Φγ be the function with γ = (γe)e∈E and γe = min{ke + 1, d + δ} for e ∈ E. Let
o ∈ OPT be a social optimum. Consider any sequence of (d + δ)-improvement moves starting
from o. By Theorem 2, we know that this sequence converges to a state which is a (d + δ)-
approximate pure Nash equilibrium; we denote this state by e. Moreover, along this sequence
of moves, Φγ is not increasing. Hence,
Φγ(e) ≤ Φγ(o).
Using this fact and applying Lemma 6 repeatedly to both o and e, we obtain
C(e) ≤
d+ 1
d+ δ
Φγ(e) ≤
d+ 1
d+ δ
Φγ(o) ≤
d+ 1
d+ δ
C(o).
The theorem follows.
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